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Abstract 
 
Most FDI takes place between the developed countries, which suggests that the market-
seeking motive is important for understanding FDI. However, given the stylized fact that 
trade barriers (e.g. transportation costs and financial barriers) have declined over the past 20 
years, models that aim to explain market-seeking FDI tend to predict a decline in FDI. Neary 
(2008) offers two explanations for this puzzle: (1) the export platform motive (where firms 
gain access to an integrated market by investing in one of the “integrated” countries); (2) 
Neary’s (2007) GOLE model, which explains cross-border mergers and acquisitions (this 
model is of interest since most FDI comes in the form of M&As). By using a gravity 
framework, where we also deal with the “zero gravity problem”, we confirm the predictions 
of the GOLE model. 
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1.  Introduction 
Two waves stand out in the history of globalization. The first wave took place in-between 
1850-1913, and the second wave started after WWII and continues until this day (see Bordo 
et al. 2003); moreover, Baldwin (2006) characterizes globalization in terms of two great 
unbundlings. In his view, during the first wave and much of the second wave, the fall in 
transportation costs and the removal of trade barriers spatially unbundled production from 
consumption, which enabled international specialization.2 With the second unbundling, the 
start of which Baldwin (2006) dates at around 1980-1990, production itself is increasingly 
geographically separated; that is, it is no longer the case that production takes place under a 
single roof. In this light, new technologies enable firms to relocate certain stages of the 
production process to other countries.  
 
Figure 1  Development of GDP, FDI, and trade 
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Source: van Marrewijk (2007, p. 325) 
 
As Figure 1 shows, throughout the past 15 years the growth rate of FDI has surpassed the 
growth rates of both world GDP and world trade. This increased importance of FDI has led 
to an enthralling and relatively new research agenda that tries to explain the existence of 
multinational enterprises or MNEs (see for example Markusen, 2002; Barba-Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004; Helpman, 2006; and Brakman and Garretsen, 2008). A key feature of these 
 
2 This is the standard or textbook view of globalization. 
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models is the role of trade barriers or, in general, economic distance in determining FDI, 
since distance related variables are crucial for understanding FDI patterns. For example, if 
FDI is mainly market seeking, then larger trade costs will stimulate FDI. If, on the other 
hand, FDI is factor-cost seeking, then higher trade barriers will reduce FDI, since it would 
be more expensive to re-import intermediate products. Given that most FDI continues to 
take place between developed economies, the dominant motive for FDI seems to be the 
market-seeking motive.3 This last observation presents us with a puzzle, since the fall in 
trade barriers during the last two decades (e.g. EU integration) should have led to a 
reduction of market-seeking FDI (see Neary, 2007 and 2008). As we have argued and as 
Figure 1 illustrates, the opposite seems true (i.e. FDI has become more important). 
 
Neary (2008) identifies and analyzes possible explanations for this puzzle. His first 
argument is that FDI might not only be market seeking (in a bilateral sense), but can be of 
the “export-platform” type; that is, firms are looking for a central location from which to 
serve a set of closely related and integrated countries. The inclusion of these so-called 
“third country” effects may explain why increased EU integration stimulates FDI in the EU, 
especially from the USA (thereby bypassing EU-US trade costs that would be incurred if 
the goods were to be exported from the USA to the EU). There is evidence that these “third 
country” effects or spatial linkages are important (Garretsen and Peeters, 2008), but also 
evidence that they are not (Blonigen et al., 2007). The second explanation, and one that 
constitutes the starting point for the present paper, follows from an application of Neary’s 
GOLE (General Oligopolistic Equilibrium) model (see Neary, 2007 and 2008). This model 
deals with the aforementioned puzzle, given that it addresses the stylized fact that most FDI 
flows are in the form of cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (hereafter, M&As). 
Therefore, in this paper and using a “new” gravity model approach, we will test the 
relevance of distance and other determinants (notably financial integration) for the value of 
cross-border M&As.4 Based on the Thomson data set for M&As, we use an extensive data 
set with firm-specific M&A data for 211 countries during the period 1986-2005. 
 
The goal of the research herein is twofold; first, we want to establish whether our gravity 
approach can help unlock the value of cross-border M&As. To date, and despite its 
quantitative importance (see section 2), gravity studies have mainly focused on trade or on 
                                                 
3 The share of FDI to developing countries is increasing, see Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
4 A companion paper (Garita and van Marrewijk, 2008) analyzes the number of deals. 
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FDI in general, and have largely ignored cross-border M&As (for exceptions, see Evenett, 
2004, and Di Giovanni, 2005). Second, and related to the abovementioned observations, by 
focusing on the distance variable and on financial openness, we seek to find out if our 
gravity model can help us improve our understanding of the relationship between economic 
and financial integration on the one hand and the value of cross-border M&As on the other 
hand. Our main results are that the market-seeking motive is important and that market size 
variables related to the target increase the value of M&As. Furthermore, the results are 
consistent with Neary’s (2008) prediction, insofar as the distance variable reflects 
integration. Concerning financial openness, the results are more ambiguous for countries 
that are already active in M&A activity; however, for the ‘passive’ group (i.e. countries that 
do not engage in M&A activity), financial openness seems to be a prerequisite to attract 
cross-border M&As. 
 
The paper evolves as follows. In section 2 we present several stylized facts on FDI, and in 
particular on cross-border M&As; furthermore, we outline5 how the recent rise of FDI, 
dominated by cross border M&As, can be reconciled with the ostensible increase of 
economic and financial integration. Section 3 discusses our estimation strategy and 
introduces our gravity model by focusing on the “zero-gravity” problem. Section 4 presents 
our estimation results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Cross-Border M&As and the Neary model 
Looking at FDI as a broad category obscures the fact that most FDI is in the form of cross-
border M&As. Figure 2 shows a decomposition of FDI and it is clear that M&As constitute 
the bulk of FDI, whereas Greenfield FDI is considerably less important than M&As. The 
main difference between these two forms of investments, is that in an M&A “control of 
assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, the former becoming an 
affiliate of the latter” (UNCTAD, 2000). However, it has not been until recently that models 
in international economics have started to emerge, which enable us to understand M&As. 
Neary’s (2007) model takes the standard partial equilibrium explanations for M&As one 
step further. In the literature, two motives are mentioned to explain M&As: a strategic 
motive (reduce competition) and an efficiency motive (cost reductions).  
 
                                                 
5 Using Neary (2007, 2008) which is our main point of reference. 
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An explanation of cross-border M&As, however, also has to explain the cross-border part 
of the deals. In this vein, trade theory suggests that comparative advantage could be 
included in a full or general equilibrium explanation of M&As. A different but equally 
novel line of research in international economics (see Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2004; 
or Helpman, 2006 for surveys), seeks to understand the conditions under which firms 
decide to locate (part of) their production abroad (the so-called off-shoring decision). When 
they decide to offshore, some firms do so under the flag of FDI, while other firms go for 
outsourcing. However, in this stream of literature, and in contrast to its empirical relevance 
illustrated in Figure 2, the analysis of cross-border M&As is still in its infancy.  
 
Figure 2  Distribution of different types of FDI 
Foreign Direct Investment
Greenfield investments Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As)
Mergers Acquisitions
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Source: Brakman et al. (2007); data: UNCTAD (2000); 78-22% split in value terms, other % in # of deals 
 
Our overview of the structure of cross-border M&As is based on Thomson’s Global 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database, which provides the best and most extensive data 
source for M&As to date. Its main sources of information are financial newspapers and 
specialized agencies like Bloomberg and Reuters. Our Thomson data set begins in 1979 and 
ends in August 2006. Initially, the focus in the Thomson data set was on American M&As; 
nevertheless, systematic M&A data for almost all countries is available from the mid 1980s 
onwards. Therefore, in presenting the data we will focus on the period 1986 – 2005. 
 
We collected information on all completed /unconditional cross-border M&As with a deal 
value of at least $10 million, which means that for the period 1986 – 2005 we have 27,541 
cross-border M&As. As Table 1 shows, most M&As result in effective ownership; 
furthermore, about 50% of M&As take place within the same sector (i.e. horizontal 
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M&As). We can only speculate as to why this might be the case; however, as previously 
mentioned,6 a likely explanation is that most cross-border M&A are market seeking. That 
is, taking one of your competitors out of the market reduces competition and raises profits. 
Furthermore, buying a firm outside one’s own sector might be motivated by an efficiency 
motive, since it can be profitable to control a larger part of the value chain. Nonetheless, 
and regardless of the strategy, both motives increase profits after the take-over. 
 
Table 1 Overview of cross-border M&As 
 # of deals per cent 
Cross-border M&As, 1986-2005  27,541  
 Effective M&As  27,461 99.7 
 Average per cent of shares acquired   75.5 
 Average per cent of shares owned after deal   80.1 
 # horizontal M&As (2-digit level) 13,605 49.4 
 
Figure 3 illustrates that the share of horizontal M&As is very stable over time when 
measured by the number of deals; fluctuating around the average of 49 per cent (ranging 
from a low of 45.1 per cent in 1986 to a high of 51.5 per cent in 1996). Horizontal M&As 
are substantially more volatile when measured using the value of the deals; fluctuating 
around the average of 56 per cent, ranging from a low of 46.7 per cent in 1988 to a high of 
73.0 per cent in 1999. 
 
Figure 3   Horizontal (2-digit) cross-border M&As; share of total, # of deals and value 
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Horizontal lines indicate averages for the period 1986-2005. 
                                                 
6 Of course, strategic motives may (also) be at work here. 
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 Those who would argue that the value of horizontal M&As has declined since 1999, are 
obviously obscuring the fact that the 1999 peak is not representative over a longer time 
horizon. Moreover, the 2005 value of horizontal M&As of 55.2 per cent is very close to the 
long run average of 56 per cent. Using either measure we find little support for the 
argument that the share of horizontal M&As is declining. From an international economics 
perspective, the question arises whether existing theories of FDI can explain the dominance 
of horizontal FDI. On the face of it, this is not the case; assuming that during our sample 
period (1985-2005) trade costs (broadly defined) have decreased, the standard FDI model 
predicts that horizontal FDI should have become less important. In terms of the proximity-
concentration trade-off, a drop in trade costs shifts the trade-off in favor of exporting. That 
is, with falling trade costs foreign markets might be better served by exporting instead of 
(horizontal) FDI. However, Neary (2008) shows that falling trade costs might nonetheless 
explain the rise of horizontal FDI, and thus the bulk of cross-border M&As.7 See Box 1 for 
a summary of Neary’s (2007 and 2008) reasoning. The puzzle put forward in this paper 
depends on whether or not trade integration has indeed taken place. Although the exact 
measurements of trade costs is difficult (see Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004 for a 
discussion), the consensus is that transportation costs in the period under consideration 
have declined in general (Hummels, 2007). 
 
Figure 4  Cross-border M&As, 1985 – 2005; # of deals and value 
Cross-border M&As, 1985-2005; # of deals (left hand scale) 
and value in 2005 $ billion (right hand scale)
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7 Once we allow for an FDI model that explicitly incorporates the possibility of cross-border M&As, instead 
of merely looking at FDI as a black box (see Neary, 2007). 
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Box 1  - Cross-border M&As and Economic Integration 
This box presents a simple way to look at a cross-border M&A. However, the reader must 
keep in mind that this box is more of a way of organizing thoughts, rather than a complete 
model but it illustrates the key issues involved (for a complete model, the reader is referred 
to Neary, 2007). Let “1” and “0” indicate the post- and pre-merger situation, respectively. 
Then the gain of taking over a Home firm, , by a foreign firm is given by: HG
(1) [ ] 0.)*,(.)*,(.)*,1( 0*0*1 >−−−= nnnnnnGH πππ  
The first term (in square brackets) relates to the gain in profitability from reduced 
competition by taking over the domestic firm; that is, the number of domestic firms is 
reduced by 1, from n to (n-1). The number of foreign firms, n*, does not change. The 
second term indicates the cost of acquiring the domestic firm. This is a function of profits 
of the target – the more profitable a target is the higher the take-over costs – and the cost of 
financing the take-over. If the acquirer has a windfall gain, for example, higher share prices 
due to the takeover, the finance costs are smaller The │. indicates that other variables are 
taken as given (for example cost factors that reflect differences in relative costs). The 
balance between the change in profits and the costs involved in the M&A determines 
whether a takeover will take place. The influence of the takeover cost is such that cost 
differences cannot be too large; otherwise, taking over a firm that is much more efficient 
than the acquirer is becomes too expensive.  
 
How can economic integration (a fall in trade costs) go along with an increase in M&As? 
First, as Neary (2008) points out, the export platform argument offers an explanation that is 
in line with the proximity-concentration models that seek to explain horizontal FDI. Firms 
gain access to an integrated region by investing in one of its members in order to gain 
access to the overall region. However, in the context of equation (1), economic integration 
also leads to more horizontal FDIs, especially M&As, but for a different reason. For 
example, a reduction in trade barriers increases the profitability of an exporting firm in the 
foreign market, and this makes a takeover more likely. Moreover, a reduction in trade 
barriers also increases competition in both markets, since this increases the likelihood of a 
cross-border M&A (as takeover costs become smaller), but on the other hand, it also 
reduces profits of the acquirer, and this makes a takeover less likely. The balance is such 
that more economic integration leads to more M&As (Neary, 2007 and 2008) 
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A historical perspective reveals another remarkable characteristic of (cross-border) M&As. 
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of all cross-border M&As over time for our sample period, 
both measured as the number of deals and the value of deals (in constant 2005 $ bn., using 
the US GDP deflator). Clearly, even when looking at this relatively short period, there is 
substantial variation over time, with periods of rapid increase followed by periods of rapid 
decline. This corroborates the more general finding that M&As come in waves. To date, 
five merger waves have been identified throughout the 20th century, three of which took 
place after WWII (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). The third wave took place in the 
late 1960-early 1970s. The fourth wave ran from (about) the mid 1980s until 1990. The 
fifth wave started around 1995 and ended in 2000 with the collapse of the “new economy”. 
Figure 4 also shows that a subsequent sixth (still ongoing) merger wave started in the 21st 
century around 2003.8 
 
Figure 5  Inter-regional cross-border M&As; % of total (value), 2001-2005 
developing region
high income region
The thickness of an arrow is proportional to the 
size of the M&A flow (percent of total inter-
regional M&As, rounded to nearest integer)
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NB: all intra-regional M&As are excluded from the figure. The total value of inter-regional M&As is 100 per 
cent; only flows above 0.5 per cent are shown (this excludes 53 of 72 possible arrows). 
 
In rounding-up our stylized facts discussion regarding cross-border M&As, we focus on 
inter-regional M&As in our sample (see also Appendix A). This gives us an indication of 
the extent to which different global regions interact with one another by delivering more 
 
8 Note that the data used in this paper covers the fourth and fifth waves. 
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valuable cross-border M&As. Figure 5 depicts the inter-regional cross-border connections 
for the period 2001-2005, rounded to the nearest integer. Since there are 9 global regions 
there are 72 different inter-regional connections.9 First, we note that by far the largest and 
most valuable inter-regional M&A flows are from North America to Western Europe (28 
per cent of the total), and vice versa (22 per cent of the total). Together these two flows 
account for 50 per cent of the value of all inter-regional M&As and clearly dwarf all other 
inter-regional connections. Second, Western Europe is buying substantial amounts of firms 
in Eastern Europe (6 per cent). Third, the other high-income region connections (between 
EUR and AAS and between NAM and AAS) are considerable (about 5 per cent each). 
Fourth, M&A flows toward East Asia and the Pacific are still rather small, certainly 
compared to the attention this receives in the popular media. Fifth, and finally, Western 
Europe is the M&A center of gravity vis-à-vis creating more value; in other words, it is the 
only global region with connections to all other regions.10 
 
3. Methodology and Estimation Strategy 
By now, a standard tool to deal with distance-related cross-border economic interactions 
like bilateral trade or FDI flows is the gravity model first developed by Tinbergen (1962). 
After a period in which the gravity model fell out of fashion for its lack of theoretical 
underpinnings (despite its empirical success), the gravity model has seen a revival as it has 
become clear that it can be derived from (a wide range) of theoretical models with solid 
micro-foundations (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, for a trade survey and 
Bergstrand and Egger, 2007, for an FDI foundation). Notwithstanding this revival, the 
number of models that produce a gravity-type specification is relatively large, thereby 
making the gravity model inapt as a tool to discriminate between different theoretical trade 
models (see Deardorff, 1998; and Helpman et al, 2007). Our aim, however, is not to 
discriminate between theoretical trade models but merely to test the relevance of distance 
and other determinants for the value of bilateral M&A flows, specifically in relation to the 
hypotheses derived by Neary (2007 and 2008). 
 
Econometrically, the estimations of the gravity model, be it for trade flows or FDI flows, 
are not without problems, given the “zero gravity problem” (see Anderson and van 
                                                 
9 Only 19 of these flows appear in Figure 5, since the remaining 53 flows are rounded to 0 per cent. This 
already indicates that ‘zero’ observations are important in the sample, and are important for the estimates (see 
section 3). 
10 This is reminiscent of the role of Western Europe in inter-regional trade flows (van Marrewijk, 2007).  
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Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Bosker, 2008; Bosker and 
Garretsen, 2007). For our purposes this is an important issue, since the percentage of 
observations with “zero M&As”, depending on the precise (sub) sample, is quite high (see 
next section). The existence of zero M&A flows constitutes a problem because the often-
preferred log-linearized gravity specification is undefined for observations with zero flows. 
A proper handling of these zero observations is therefore important (see Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006; Helpman et al. 2007; Baldwin and Harrigan 2007; Garita and van 
Marrewijk, 2008). Furthermore, OLS estimates of the log-linearized model may be both 
biased and inefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
 
A common method of handling the “zero-gravity” problem thus far has been to simply 
discard the zeros by truncating the sample and using OLS, or simply to add a constant 
factor to each observation on the dependent variable and then estimate the gravity model 
through a Tobit estimation. These approaches are correct as long as the zero values are 
randomly distributed; however, if they are not random, as is often the case, then it 
introduces selection bias (see Bosker, 2008). Until recently, this problem has been ignored 
in gravity studies, but it can be handled by means of sample selection correction. In this 
light, Helpman, et al. (2007) propose a theoretical model rationalizing the zero trade flows 
and propose estimating the gravity equation with a correction for the probability of 
countries to trade. In order to estimate their model, they apply a two-step estimation 
technique (similar to sample selection models commonly used in labor economics). To 
implement the new estimator, one needs to find an appropriate exclusion restriction for 
identification of the second stage equation, which can be quite difficult.11 
The above suggestion to distinguish between two groups of observations to adequately deal 
with the zero-flow problem can be done in an empirically flexible way by using Lambert’s 
(1992) zero-inflated approach (aternative names are "with zeroes," "zero altered," and 
"hurdle" models), which is similar to the Heckman Selection model but does not rely on the 
associated normality assumptions, and is therefore less restrictive (Heckman, 1974, see 
                                                 
11 One could argue that the 2-step estimation procedure used by Helpman et al. (2007) is not introduced for 
econometric purposes (i.e. to deal with the “zero gravity problem”), but follows directly from their preferred 
trade-theoretical model (in the tradition of Melitz, 2003). In the latter model, it is crucial to distinguish 
between the probability of trade and the volume of trade (or in their terminology, between the extensive and 
intensive margins of trade), which is exactly what their 2-step-estimation procedure does. As to the use of the 
exclusion restriction (a variable that in the 1st (probit) step is included to influence the probability of trade but 
is not part of the 2nd step as it is meant not to influence the volume of trade), Helpman et al. (2007) use 
religion (see also Bosker and Garretsen, 2008).  
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Razin and Sadka, 2007 for an application on FDI).12 The zero-inflated model assumes that 
there are two latent groups of observations; an observation in the (always 0) Passive Group 
has an outcome of 0 with a probability of 1; an observation in the (potentially) Active 
Group might have a zero outcome, but there is a positive probability that there is a non-zero 
outcome. This process is developed in two stages:  
(i) model membership into the latent groups (Active or Passive) using a logit model 
and observed characteristics (so-called “inflation” variables because they “inflate” 
the number of zeros). 
(ii) model the value of cross-border M&As for observations in the Active Group via a 
Poisson or negative binomial regression. 
The Poisson model imposes the restriction that the conditional mean of the dependent 
variable is equal to its variance. The negative binomial regression model generalizes the 
Poisson model by introducing an individual unobserved effect into the conditional mean 
which allows for over-dispersion in the data (see Blonigen, 1997; Coughlin, 2000; 
Wooldridge, 2002; and Barry, 2003). The approach can also use it for our non-integer data 
(the value of M&As; see Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, for trade flows). The Vuong 
(1989) test can be used for selection of non-nested models; repeated application provides 
overwhelming support in favour of the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model, such 
that we restrict attention below to reporting the ZINB results. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Baseline estimations 
To test the model outlined above from the acquirer's perspective, we analyze the value of 
cross-border M&As undertaken by firms in a specific country for the period 1986-2005, 
giving us a total of almost 1 million observations. For both the acquiring and target country, 
and in line with the gravity approach, we include GDP and GDP per capita as explanatory 
variables. As with bilateral trade, we expect GDP (per capita) to have a positive effect on 
cross border M&A for both the acquiring (exporting) and target (importing) country. The 
bilateral (geodesic) distance (Distij) between countries i and j is also included. As 
previously mentioned, cross-border M&As come in waves. Therefore, in order to deal with 
this feature we construct two variables Wave1 and Wave2, where the former (latter) denotes 
the number of cross border M&As in the year (two years) prior to time t.  
 
                                                 
12 This avoids the difficulty of trying to find an appropriate exclusion restriction (Helpman et al, 2007). 
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The variables common language, colony, and common border capture the transaction- or 
information costs associated with cross border M&As; they are taken from the CEPII 
database. We also include de jure financial openness in our baseline specification, since 
cross border M&As are an example of international capital flows. This variable (measured 
by the Chinn-Ito index) is thought to have a positive effect on M&As, in particular where it 
concerns the financial openness of the target country.13 As we explained in section 2, set 
against the recent FDI models, the rise of FDI (in casu, cross border M&As) is not easy to 
reconcile with ongoing economic integration (falling trade or transport costs). Apart from 
economic integration, and different from gravity models of international trade, we expect 
that cross border M&As are also (or even mainly) driven by the degree of financial 
integration and/or other financial variables. When changing our baseline specification we 
will include various financial variables. In addition, we incorporate regional fixed effects 
(for the regions introduced in Figure 5). Note, that these region fixed effects are different 
from the country-based distance effects.  
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for our baseline ‘gravity’ model. The columns 
related to the active group give estimates for the group for which the observations are not 
necessarily zero, the columns with respect to the passive group give estimates for the 
always-zero group of observations. With the exception of the wave variables, we use the 
same characteristics for both groups. The signs for these variables are often opposite, which 
makes intuitive sense. Note that we have indeed a very large number of zero observations. 
The estimation results for the Active Group in Table 2 show that typical gravity variables 
help to explain the value of cross-border M&As between countries. A larger market size as 
measured by GDP leads to a higher value of M&As both from an acquirer and target 
perspective. GDP per capita only has a positive effect on the value of M&As from the 
target perspective, indicating that market size is not the only income effect determining the 
value of M&As, but also that the distribution of income is important. Regarding financial 
openness, we find that it is a prerequisite for M&As to take place (the variables are 
strongly significant in the column for the Passive Group), but that it is relatively 
unimportant in determining the value of M&As. Capital mobility seems to act as a cut-off 
or hurdle variable; without capital mobility M&As are unlikely to occur at all.  
                                                 
13 See Chinn and Ito (2002, 2005) for more details on this index. 
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 Table 2 Baseline ZINB estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
  coefficient inc. rate ratio coefficient 
Ln(GDP)    
 acquirer 0.347*** 100 -0.680*** 
 target 0.372*** 110 -0.708*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)    
 acquirer 0.139  -1.354*** 
 target 0.342*** 49 -0.601*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.285*** -22 0.787*** 
Financial Openness    
 acquirer 0.055*** 9 -0.161*** 
 target 0.028  -0.072*** 
Wave1 0.00010** 7  
Wave2 0.00022*** 31  
Common Languagea 0.400*** 49 -1.143*** 
Colonya 0.454*** 58 -1.022*** 
Common Bordera -0.136* -13 -0.441*** 
McFadden adj. R2 0.241 Region fixed-effects yes 
Observations 255,468 Non-zero obs. 5,290 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. For at least 10% 
significant variables: the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities; the incidence rate ratio is 
calculated as: 100×[exp(β)×std.dev.-1]. Incidence ratio’s indicate the (percentage) change in the 
value of M&A if a variable changes by a standard deviation. 
a inc. rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)-1] for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
 
What is the relation between economic integration (here approximated by the distance 
variable Dij) and M&As? If distance proxies increased economic integration, then we find 
evidence in favor of Neary’s GOLE model. That is, increased economic integration 
increases competition in the home market, which lowers profits of the target (and acquirer) 
and makes a takeover more likely. In addition, increased integration makes profits of the 
acquirer in foreign markets larger, which also increases the probability of a takeover, but 
profits of the target also increase, which makes the probability smaller. The balance of all 
effects is positive (Neary, 2008). The negative sign of the distance variable is consistent 
with this line of reasoning that is, the lower the distance, the higher the value of M&As. In 
addition, the wave variables further validate Neary’s model, since initial M&As stimulate 
further M&As because profits in the market increase with less competitors. These effects of 
economic integration are enlarged by the results for common language and colony; if 
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integration takes place in already culturally integrated areas (e.g. areas that share the same 
jurisprudence), then this further stimulates M&As. In contrast to the standard effect for 
trade flows, the effect of a common border on M&A activity is negative. This is in line with 
expectations: given that an M&A takes place, the negative border effect indicates that firms 
want to create some distance. For nearby economies, alternative modes of entry are 
available. For example, at close range, exporting might be more profitable than setting up 
shop in foreign markets.  
 
4.2 - Baseline estimation sensitivity analysis 
We also investigated the robustness of our results, by augmenting our baseline model with 
several "pull" and "push" factors that are considered important determinants of cross-border 
M&As (see Appendix B for estimation results). That is, while “push” factors may help 
explain the timing and magnitude of new capital inflows, “pull” factors may be necessary to 
explain the regional distribution of new capital flows (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). 
 
4.2.1 - US interest rates 
An important "push" factor is the level of interest rates in the home country, which we will 
proxy by the 10-year US bond yield. In the literature, there is a consensus that high real 
interest rates hamper FDI, other things being equal. Albuquerque et al. (2005) find a 
significant and negative relation between the US T-Bill yield and FDI inflows; moreover, 
Calvo et al. (2001) show that FDI inflows to emerging markets are lower during US 
monetary tightening. Our results are in line with the literature as far as the Active Group is 
concerned, since the US yield coefficient is negative and a one standard deviation increase 
in US interest rate decreases the value of M&A activity by over 10%.  
 
4.2.2 – Market structure 
Unlike the surge in capital inflows to developing countries in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
which were almost exclusively driven by commercial bank lending, capital inflows in the 
1990s were associated with a stern rise in bond and equity portfolio inflows; much of these 
inflows have gravitated towards larger equity emerging markets, bypassing many countries 
(Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). An often given explanation is that markets must overcome a 
threshold set of requirements (market size, accounting standards, disclosure requirements, 
transparency, etc.) in order to attract capital flows. Accordingly, we augment our model by 
including the lagged stock market capitalization as proxy for the size of the domestic 
 15
capital market (an indirect proxy for the size of the banking sector, see Montiel and 
Reinhart, 1999); we lag this variable to take care of any endogeneity issues. The results are 
mixed. For the Active Group only the acquirer seems to benefit from a more developed 
stock market. For the passive group, the odds of remaining in this group decrease for the 
acquirer if the capitalization of the stock market increases; however, the odds of remaining 
inactive in M&As increase for the target as the stock market capitalization increases. We 
also add the Transparency International corruption index14 (labeled Transparency) to proxy 
for the business environment in the local economy. The results are in line with 
expectations, where a less uncertain business environment will increase the value of M&As 
for the target country in the Active Group by 28%.15 For the Passive Group, making the 
business environment more transparent reduces the odds of remaining in this group for both 
acquirer and target by about 10%.  
 
4.2.3 – Macroeconomic Distortions 
We use the black market premium as a measure of expected depreciation of the local 
currency and an index of distortions. Expectated depreciation affects investment through 
several channels: (1) it is more attractive to hold foreign assets; (2) economic uncertainty is 
higher; (3) foreign capital goods are cheaper to import at the official rate. The first two 
points suggest a negative relationship between the black market premium and foreign 
investment while the third point implies the opposite. As an indicator of distortions the 
black market premium should be negatively correlated with the value of M&As. This is in 
line with our findings as a one standard deviation increase in the black market premium 
reduces the value of cross-border M&As for the Active Group by 30%  and increases the 
odds of remaining in the Passive Group by 44%. Regarding the link between FDI and 
exchange rate uncertainty16 the literature is mixed, as volatility can both discourage FDI 
(Cushman, 1988) and produce an incentive to hedge against exchange rate shocks through 
foreign location (Aizenman, 1991). In our comprehensive study we find that these two 
forces balance as exchange rate volatility does not influence the value of cross-border 
M&As (in contrast to Blonigen, 1997, and Froot and Stein, 1991).  
 
                                                 
14 The Transparency International corruption index ranges from 0 = highly corrupt, to 10 = highly clean. 
15 The coefficient for the acquirer is not significant. 
16 As measured by the coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate. 
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4.3 Market Potential 
Following Blonigen et al. (2007), we introduce the market potential of the target country in 
our model among the set of regressors to analyze the economic platform motive for M&As. 
This variable is the distance weighted GDP of countries surrounding the target country, 
where distance is measured in proportion to the distance between Brussels and Amsterdam 
(173 km, in accordance with Blonigen et al, 2007).17 We find a negative effect for the 
market potential variable; this implies that a different market is more attractive as a target 
destination than as an attractive export platform. We conclude that the export platform FDI 
motive is not sustained by our data (see Table 3), in line with Blonigen et al. (2007). The 
other variables are consistent with our earlier findings; thereby indicating that GDP of the 
target is the dominant variable.  
 
Table 3 Outside market potential ZINB  estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative 
Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
Ln(GDP)   
 acquirer 0.269*** -0.650*** 
 target 0.160*** -0.668*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)   
 acquirer 0.252** -1.497*** 
 target 0.410*** -0.690*** 
Ln(outside market potentialtar) -0.284*** 0.784*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.260*** 0.915*** 
Financial Openness   
 acquirer 0.050** -0.122*** 
 target 0.009 -0.058*** 
Wave1 (coef × 100) 0.008  
Wave2 (coef × 100) 0.024***  
Common Language 0.411*** -0.831*** 
Colony 0.618*** -1.135*** 
Common Border -0.094 -0.289*** 
Observations 184,702 Region. fixed-effects yes 
Non-zero obs. 3,012 McFadden adj R2  
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Distances below 173 km are set equal to the normalization. Note that GDP of the target country itself is not 
included in thie outside measure as it is already included separately. 
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4.4 The baseline model over time 
We are not only interested in the impact of distance (or economic integration) and financial 
openness on the value of cross border M&As as such, but also on changes in this relation 
over time. We thus estimated our baseline model in four 5-year periods (1986-1990, 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2005). As previously mentioned, our working assumption is 
that both economic and financial integration have increased in our sample period18; 
therefore, we expect the effect of distance to change over time.19 Firstly, Table 4 shows that 
the results do not differ markedly from those for the total sample period regarding the 
impact of GDP (per capita), waves, common border, and common colony.  
 
The distance coefficients for both the Active and Passive Groups have increased in absolute 
value terms (these results are similar to Disdier and Head, 2008), implying that distance has 
become more important over time.20 This holds in particular for the Passive Group 
coefficients. Two observations are important. First, why has the measured impact effect of 
distance increased over time? To understand this, one must realize that the estimated 
coefficients are reduced form estimates of equilibrium M&A decisions under changing 
circumstances. Economic integration is a local phenomenon (EU integration focuses on 
neighbouring European countries, and similarly for NAFTA, ASEAN, etc.) which increases 
the attractiveness of nearby M&As, to which firms respond by engaging more in local 
M&A activity. This, in turn, is reflected in the increased impact of distance on M&As, 
particularly for the Passive Group. Second, what do the changed coefficients imply? In a 
nutshell, the higher impact of distance on M&As indicates that economic integration 
(reduction of distance, broadly measured) is becoming more important over time.  
 
The effects of common language follow a similar pattern as the distance coefficients; that is 
the coefficients increase over time (in absolute value) for both the Active and Passive 
Groups. This implies that as countries have moved to reduce transaction (business) costs 
between them, the value of cross-border M&As has increased accordingly. The effect of 
colony on the value of M&As decreases over time for the Active Group, whereas it remains 
relatively satble over time for the Passive Group. Regarding the common border effect, we 
find that it is relatively stable over time, but only affects the Passive Group. In other words, 
                                                 
18 Granted that, as is standard in gravity studies, distance not only reflects actual transport costs, but also other 
forms of trade barriers. 
19 Keep in mind Neary (2008) and Appendix A, where economic integration is bound to have a positive 
impact on cross border M&As. 
20 The only exception is the drop in value for the most recent period for the Active Group. 
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as economic integration increases, and countries start to ‘share’ a common border, the odds 
of remaining in the Passive Group decrease considerably (approximately by 40%).  
 
Table 4 Baseline ZINB  estimates, separate periods 
 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 
Active Group; Negative Binomial coefficients 
Ln(GDP)     
 acquirer 0.354*** 0.287*** 0.365*** 0.368*** 
 target 0.423*** 0.333*** 0.417*** 0.302*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)     
 acquirer 0.039 0.078 0.257* -0.066 
 target -0.354** 0.300*** 0.400*** 0.338*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.256*** -0.269*** -0.361*** -0.279*** 
Financial Openness     
 acquirer 0.084 0.064 0.225*** -0.023 
 target 0.112* 0.128*** 0.024 0.000 
Wave1 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0001 0.0002 
Wave2  0.0005* 0.0003*** 0.0005** 
Common Languagea 0.170 0.223* 0.587*** 0.457*** 
Colonya 0.748*** 0.341** 0.574*** 0.390** 
Common Bordera -0.213 -0.252* -0.165 0.112 
Passive Group; Logit coefficients 
Ln(GDP)     
 acquirer -0.595*** -0.649*** -0.691*** -0.727*** 
 target -0.671*** -0.662*** -0.718*** -0.765*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)     
 acquirer -1.378*** -1.032*** -1.365*** -1.534*** 
 target -1.167*** -0.703*** -0.497*** -0.566*** 
Ln(Distij) 0.564*** 0.772*** 0.793*** 0.910*** 
Financial Openness     
 acquirer -0.327*** -0.263*** -0.116*** -0.074*** 
 target -0.196*** -0.124*** -0.024 0.006 
Common Languagea -0.716*** -1.246*** -1.094*** -1.244*** 
Colonya -1.145*** -1.041*** -1.018*** -1.038*** 
Common Bordera 0.269 -0.500*** -0.399*** -0.438** 
McFadden adj. R2 0.272 0.254 0.232 0.235 
Observations 68,209 67,514 88,972 57,683 
Non-zero obs. 667 1,235 2,242 1,288 
Region. fixed-effects yes yes yes Yes 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-border 
M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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 5. Conclusions 
Most FDI is between similar (developed) countries, predominantly in the form of M&As. 
This suggests that the market-seeking motive of FDI dominates the data. At present, this 
seems to be the consensus in the literature. The empirical puzzle identified by Neary (2008) 
is that we have witnessed both an increase of cross-border M&As and increased economic 
integration. If the market-seeking motive indeed dominates the data these facts provide us 
with a puzzle because increased integration should result in less M&As as markets can 
more easily be served through exports instead of FDI. Neary (2008) suggests two solutions 
to the puzzle: the export platform motive for FDI, and the profit-seeking motive that 
follows from his own GOLE model. In the former case, FDI in a specific country gives 
access to surrounding markets, whereas in the latter case M&As take place through a subtle 
balancing act between higher profits and higher takeover costs. Using a zero-inflated 
negative binomial model, we find evidence: 
 against the export platform motive; target GDP is more important than distance 
weighted GDP of surrounding countries (with a negative impact).  
 in favor of Neary’s (2008) GOLE model for M&As in a world characterized by 
increased economic integration.  
 in support of financial openness as a necessary condition for M&As to take place;  once 
a threshold level is reached, financial openness has little impact on the value of M&As.  
 confirming the impact of ongoing economic integration on M&As, which like trade 
flows are becoming more local (impact of distance increases over time). 
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Appendix A - Regional distribution of cross-border M&As 
 
Table A1 - Regional distribution of cross-border M&As, 2000-2005 
a. Number of deals (% of total); shaded cells: higher than 0.5% 
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum 
AAS 5.7 2.7 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.4 0.1 13.1 
EAP 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 
ECA 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 
EUR 2.5 1.3 3.4 26.5 2.6 0.4 9.7 0.8 0.6 47.8 
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.1 
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
NAM 3.1 1.2 0.8 11.2 2.1 0.1 12.1 0.4 0.3 31.2 
SAS 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 
SSA 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2 
sum 12.2 6.3 5.5 40.6 6.6 0.6 25.0 2.0 1.3 100 
b. Value of deals (constant 2005 $, % of total); shaded cells: higher than 0.5% 
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum 
AAS 3.0 1.5 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 8.7 
EAP 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 
ECA 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
EUR 2.0 0.5 2.2 38.1 2.7 0.3 15.8 0.2 0.6 62.4 
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
NAM 1.8 0.4 0.4 10.5 1.2 0.0 9.9 0.1 0.1 24.3 
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 
SSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 
sum 7.1 2.9 3.5 51.3 5.0 0.4 28.6 0.4 0.9 100 
c. Ratio of value of deals (% of total) to number of deals (% of total) 
shaded cells: higher than 1 
from AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA sum 
AAS 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.7 
EAP 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.3 5.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 
ECA 0.7 na 0.8 0.6 na 0.2 0.4 na 1.3 0.7 
EUR 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.2 1.1 1.3 
LAC na 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 1.6 na na 0.7 
MNA 3.7 na na 6.3 na 0.4 na 0.2 0.1 2.6 
NAM 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.8 
SAS 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.3 
SSA 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 
sum 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.7 1 
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Appendix B - Baseline estimations with different financial market variables  
 
Table B1 - Exchange rate variability ZINB estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
  coefficient inc. rate ratio coefficient 
Ln(GDP)    
 acquirer 0.309*** 85 -0.672*** 
 target 0.351*** 101 -0.711*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)    
 acquirer 0.213** 28 -1.383*** 
 target 0.339*** 49 -0.600*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.271*** -21 0.837*** 
Financial Openness    
 acquirer 0.024  -0.173*** 
 target 0.045** 7 -0.097*** 
Wave1 0.00015*** 10  
Wave2 0.00019*** 27  
Exchange rate var. 0.036  0.055 
Common Languagea 0.610*** 84 -1.050*** 
Colonya 0.387*** 47 -1.092*** 
Common Bordera -0.225** -20 -0.311*** 
McFadden adj. R2 0.249 Region. fixed-effects yes 
Observations 211,256 Non-zero obs. 3,921 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. For at least 10% 
significant variables the incidence rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)×std.dev.-1]. 
a inc. rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)-1] for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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Table B2 - US yield ZINB estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
  coefficient inc. rate ratio coefficient 
Ln(GDP)    
 acquirer 0.343*** 99 -0.671*** 
 target 0.383*** 115 -0.710*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)    
 acquirer 0.399*** 59 -1.333*** 
 target 0.341*** 49 -0.587*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.290*** -22 0.765*** 
Financial Openness    
 acquirer 0.078*** 13 -0.178*** 
 target 0.039** 6 -0.089*** 
US yield -11.975*** -13 11.858*** 
Common Languagea 0.421*** 52 -1.131*** 
Colonya 0.493*** 64 -1.011*** 
Common Bordera -0.114  -0.366*** 
McFadden adj. R2 0.241 Region. fixed-effects yes 
Observations 282,378 Non-zero obs. 5,432 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. For at least 10% 
significant variables the incidence rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)×std.dev.-1]. 
a inc. rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)-1] for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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Table B3 - Black market premium ZINB estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
  coefficient inc. rate ratio coefficient 
Ln(GDP)    
 acquirer 0.330*** 85 -0.638*** 
 target 0.379*** 103 -0.643*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)    
 acquirer 0.424*** 64 -1.386*** 
 target 0.256*** 35 -0.579*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.289*** -23 0.611*** 
Ln(Black market prem)    
 acquirer -0.160*** -26 0.194*** 
 target 0.003  0.202*** 
Wave1 0.00054*** 42  
Wave2 -0.00037*** -26  
Common Languagea 0.332*** 39 -0.898*** 
Colonya 0.556*** 74 -1.046*** 
Common Bordera -0.248** -22 -0.185 
McFadden adj. R2 0.226 Region. fixed-effects yes 
Observations 94,182 Non-zero obs. 2,595 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. For at least 10% 
significant variables the incidence rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)×std.dev.-1]. 
a inc. rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)-1] for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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Table B4 - Transparency ZINB estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
  coefficient inc. rate ratio coefficient 
Ln(GDP)    
 acquirer 0.338*** 98 -0.677*** 
 target 0.410*** 129 -0.694*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)    
 acquirer 0.204* 27 -0.963*** 
 target 0.103* 13 -0.426*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.295*** -22 0.763*** 
Financial Openness    
 acquirer 0.107*** 19 -0.248*** 
 target 0.042* 7 -0.104*** 
Transparency    
 acquirer -0.008  -0.070*** 
 target 0.083*** 28 -0.062*** 
Wave1 0.00002   
Wave2 0.00023*** 31  
Common Languagea 0.408*** 50 -1.095*** 
Colonya 0.452*** 57 -0.981*** 
Common Bordera -0.199** -18 -0.492*** 
McFadden adj. R2 0.246 Region. fixed-effects yes 
Observations 197,785 Non-zero obs. 4,002 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. For at least 10% 
significant variables the incidence rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)×std.dev.-1]. 
a inc. rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)-1] for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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Table B5 - Lagged Stock Market Value ZINB  estimates 
  
Active Group 
Negative Binomial 
Passive Group 
Logit 
  coefficient inc. rate ratio coefficient 
Ln(GDP)    
 acquirer 0.356*** 106 -0.654*** 
 target 0.342*** 101 -0.739*** 
Ln(GDP per capita)    
 acquirer -0.144  -0.931*** 
 target 0.343*** 49 -0.632*** 
Ln(Distij) -0.286*** -22 0.769*** 
Financial Openness    
 acquirer 0.064** 11 -0.203*** 
 target 0.030  -0.116*** 
Lag Stock Market Val.    
 acquirer 0.005*** 22 -0.008*** 
 target 0.001  0.003*** 
Common Languagea 0.252*** 29 -0.972*** 
Colonya 0.571*** 77 -0.972*** 
Common Bordera -0.279*** -24 -0.442*** 
McFadden adj. R2 0.252 Region. fixed-effects yes 
Observations 203,960 Non-zero obs. 3,608 
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial regression. Dependent variable is value of bilateral cross-
border M&As. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. For at least 10% 
significant variables the incidence rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)×std.dev.-1]. 
a inc. rate ratio is calculated as: 100×[exp(β)-1] for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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